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A Dutch Perspective: The Limits
of Lawful Euthanasia
Dr. Ubaldus de Vries*
I. INTRODUCTION

Discussions of euthanasia in the Netherlands and elsewhere often revolve
around the question of whether a right to euthanasia should be recognized.
Should a person have a right to require or permit another to assist him in the
execution of his decision to die? The majority of people in the Netherlands
have a moderate opinion, opining that persons have a right to euthanasia,
but only in specific circumstances such as in illness accompanied by
hopeless and unbearable suffering.' Thus, in "rights-based" language, the
2
right to assisted suicide is considered a qualified right.
In the Netherlands, the introduction of the euthanasia legislation in 2001
polarized the debate over whether a right to euthanasia should exist. On
one side of the debate are people who demand complete freedom for
individuals to choose their own destiny, and furthermore demand that all
necessary assistance in carrying out the decision be available to such
individuals.3 On the other side of the debate, an increasing minority fears
"The author studied law at the University of Leiden and wrote his Ph.D. in Ireland, at Dublin
City University. He now teaches law at Utrecht University, the Netherlands. Email:
B.deVries@law.uu.nl. This article is written in conjunction with two other articles. See
Ubaldus de Vries, Can a Legal Right to Euthanasia Exist? A Dutch Perspective on a
Universal Medico-Legal Dilemma, 9 MEDICO-LEGAL J. OF IRELAND 24-35 (2003); Ubaldus
de Vries, Lawful Euthanasia in Ireland. A Perspective on a Universal Medico-Legal
Dilemma, in A JUST SOCIETY (John Scally ed., 2003). The author would like to thank David
Tonkin for his wise comments and Elissa Koch for all the editorial work.
1. In 2001, just weeks prior to the enactment of the legislation allowing doctors to
perform euthanasia to relieve hopeless and unbearable suffering, the Minister of Health
stated that eighty percent of Dutch people supported the possibility of euthanasia as an
option to relieve patients from unbearable and hopeless suffering. TK 2000-2001, 262125
[Parliamentary Debates (Second Chamber), parliamentary year 2000-2001, no. 262125].
2. Proponents argue the right to assisted suicide stems from the right to selfdetermination and individual autonomy. See, e.g., H.J.J. LEENEN, HANDBOEK
GEZONDHEIDSRECHT-DEEL 1 RECHTEN VAN DEMENS IN DE GEZONDHEIDSZORG [TEXTBOOK
ON HEALTH LAW: PART 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN HEALTH CARE] 260 (3d ed. 1994).
3. This point of view is entertained by those who have a humanist outlook on life. See
generally P.V. ADMIRAAL EUTHANASIE EN DE EED VAN HIPPOCRATUs HERINNERINGEN VAN
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that limits have been breached and that Dutch society has gone too far.4
It is wrong to suggest though that legal and judicial inquiry in the
Netherlands has employed a rights-based dialectic to legislate for lawful
euthanasia. On the contrary, this inquiry has ignored such an approach as it
has done on previous occasions.5 Dutch law does not have a strong rightsbased judicial tradition such as that which exists in many other
jurisdictions. For example, Irish and American jurisdictions emphasize
constitutional judicial review.6 Unlike the Irish and American legislatures,
the Dutch legislature has not employed a rights-based dialectic because the
Netherlands bans constitutional judicial review.7 Thus, individuals cannot
assert their constitutionally guaranteed human rights if this would mean a
review of parliamentary or primary legislation. 8
Another difference between the Netherlands and more rights-based
jurisdictions is that the Dutch courts have not adopted the unenumerated
rights doctrine such as has developed in the United States, Ireland, and, to a
lesser extent, England. 9 Rather, in the Netherlands, the judicial inquiry has
EEN ANESTHESIOLOOG (1998). Nevertheless, the proponents of complete freedom also
consider their position to be unrealistic to a certain extent. See, e.g., MP Wessel-Tuinstra in
Vaste Commissie voor Justitie en voor de Volksgezondheid, Euthanasie,UCV 53, at 14.
4. See, for example, the essays collected in HANS ACHTERHUIS ET AL., ALS DE DOOD
VOOR HET LEVEN [A MORTAL FEAR FOR LIFE] (1995).
A historical account of the
development of society's acceptance of euthanasia was published in 2002. See JAMES
KENNEDY, EEN WELOVERWOGEN DOOD-EUTHANASIE INNEDERLAND [A WELL-CONSIDERED
DEATH: EUTHANASIA IN THE NETHERLANDS] (2002).
5. The debate over the legalization of abortion had a criminal perspective and found its
rationale in considerations of health and professional discretion. See J. REMMELINK,
HAZEWINKEL-SURINGA'S INLEIDING TOT DE STUDIE VAN HET NEDERLANDSE STRAFRECHT
[INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH CRIMINAL LAW] 368 (13th ed. 1994).
6. See RAY BYRNE & JAMES P. MCCUTCHEON, THE IRISH LEGAL SYSTEM 545 (3rd ed.
1996). In the United States, the emphasis on rights and individualism has succinctly been
examined in MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991).
7. See GRONDWET NED. [Constitution] art. 120.
8. Rights can be enforced by reference to the Convention of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, GRONDWET NED. arts. 93 & 94, but this seems unlikely to happen
with respect to euthanasia and assisted suicide as far as the Netherlands is concerned. For
further insights see the comments of the Advocate-General in Euthanasia I, HR 27 Nov.
1983, N.J. 1985, 106. It remains to be seen what the impact will be of rulings of the
European Court of Human Rights on euthanasia, such as its decision in Pretty v. United
Kingdom, Unreported, Eur. Ct. H.R., 29 Apr. 2002. The anomaly between the prohibition of
constitutional review and Convention review cannot be easily explained and will not be
further addressed. However, there is growing support to abandon the prohibition of
constitutional review.
Indeed, the Dutch Supreme Court allowed judicial review by
reference to general principles of law. Harmonisatiewet, HR 14 Apr. 1989, NJ 1989, 469.
9. In Ireland, a right to life and death was recognized in Re A Ward of Court [1995] 2
I.L.R.M. 401. In England, the decision in Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland [1993] A.C. 789 is
illustrative. Neither case sanctioned euthanasia as a legitimate method to end life but
allowed for the withdrawal of treatment in respect of patients in a (near) permanent
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focused on euthanasia from a criminal law perspective in which these
rights, such as the right to bodily integrity, and the right to selfdetermination and autonomy, are implicitly embedded. This inquiry places
the person who carries out euthanasia or assists in a suicide at the center of
the euthanasia debate, rather than the person who is seeking death. Dutch
courts have created an exception to the crime of euthanasia and assisted
0
suicide by carving out the "necessity defense" for doctors.' Accordingly,
the judicial inquiry thus far has primarily revolved around the doctor and
the boundaries of the doctor-patient relationship.
Although the necessity defense evolved from case law, it has now been
codified." A determining criterion for lawful euthanasia is the extent of
suffering of the person seeking death. Even though the nature and extent of
suffering is the foundation of the exception and the legislation, the suffering
criterion has not been further defined in the legislation and its interpretation
remains at the discretion of the courts. One important issue that arises
when considering whether euthanasia is lawful is whether the suffering
must stem from a clinical cause. On Christmas Eve of 2002, the Dutch
Supreme Court reversed a decision of a regional court that had extended the
criterion of hopeless 12 and unbearable suffering to include so-called
"existential suffering."' Although the lower court decision was reversed, it
indicated the willingness of some regional courts to allow for euthanasia on
demand and implied that lawful euthanasia may no longer need to constitute
a medical exception.
This article seeks to explain the Dutch perspective, which differs from
the rights-based perspective that is employed in the United States. The'3
and individualism.
United States legal system embraces a culture of rights
4 and recently, the decriminalization
Thus, ethical issues, such as abortion'
5
of homosexual acts between consenting male adults, are addressed within
the judicial forum, where one person claims the violation or vindication of a
vegetative state. In England this was confirmed in Regina (Pretty) v. Directorof Public
Prosecutions,Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2001] U.K.H.L. 61.
10. Cf Euthanasia I, HR 14 Nov. 1984, N.J. 1985, 106; Euthanasia II, HR 21 Oct. 1986,
N.J. 1987, 607. The decision in Chabot, HR 21 June 1994 N.J. 1994, 656 expanded the
necessity defense.
11. Cf Wet toetsing levensbedindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding (Stb. 2001,
194) [The Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act of
20011, availableat http://www.nvve.nl/english/info/euthlawenglish.doc.
12. See Brongersma, HR 24 Dec. 2002 (LJN AE8772), available at http://
www.rechtsspraak.nl. Existential suffering is referred to in this article as "non-medical"
euthanasia.
13.

Cf GLENDON, supra note 6.

14.
15.

Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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right, be it the right to self-determination, privacy, or otherwise. It is in this
context that euthanasia, arguably, is referred to as right that can be enforced
against the state. The Dutch perspective is quite different. The Netherlands
embraces a culture of pragmatism and consensus-building and prefers
ethical issues to be addressed through the political process. 16 Accordingly,
euthanasia has been addressed within both the political and the judicial
process. Prior to the 2001 legislation, euthanasia was a criminal offense
and doctors who assisted their patients were prosecuted. The courts found
opportunities within the criminal law to exonerate doctors without explicitly
making a statement about the need for lawful euthanasia. This decision was
left to the politicians. 7
This article first reviews the body of case law and the subsequent
legislation that allows for euthanasia in certain circumstances. The law has
created a medical exception that has made hopeless and unbearable
suffering the foundation of lawful euthanasia. Because "suffering" is the
root of the exception, an analysis of the judicial interpretation of "suffering"
is merited. The analysis will show that judicial interpretation has reached
its limits, and by implication, the limits of lawful euthanasia have been
reached. The limits of lawful euthanasia are then further explored with a
particular emphasis on the role of the doctor and his duty to report cases of
euthanasia. The many problems that exist are addressed before concluding
that Dutch law is at a crossroad: the courts must either extend lawful
euthanasia to include "non-medical" cases of euthanasia or maintain the
status quo which limits euthanasia to cases involving illness with hopeless
and unbearable suffering. This article concludes that, as life itself develops,
so, too, develops one's perspective on death and dying and the treatment at
life's end-that it is inevitable that to choose to die becomes as much a part
of an individual's life as one's choice to live.
II. EUTHANASIA AND THE NECESSITY DEFENSE

Discussions on euthanasia began in earnest in 1972 when a local court
found a doctor who had euthanized her mother guilty of murder. The
decision set the scene for a broad national debate about whether people, for
reasons of illness and suffering, are entitled to die in a humane fashion. As
the Netherlands does not have a system of constitutional judicial review,
16. For an English language account of Dutch legal culture see FREEK BRUINSMA,
DUTCH LEGAL CULTURE (1994).
17. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated more than once that it could not rule on the
lawfulness of euthanasia in general in the absence of broad societal consensus. See
Euthanasia I, HR 14 Nov. 1984, N.J. 1985, 106; Euthanasia II, HR 21 Oct. 1986, N.J. 1987,
607.
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cases arguing a right to euthanasia cannot be brought before the court. The
rights debate in the Netherlands is a political debate, taking place in all
forums but the judicial forum. However, in the context of euthanasia, the
courts saw an opportunity to express opinions on the matter when asked to
consider the actions of doctors who had taken the life of a patient on the
basis of what, to the doctors, appeared to be sound medical grounds. These
decisions gave an authoritative impulse to the debate and set the scene for
the eventual legislation, the first of its kind in the world permitting
euthanasia under certain circumstances. These judicial decisions focused
on whether doctors, having committed a crime by taking the life of a
patient, could be exonerated for their actions with an appeal to the necessity
defense. This defense-the necessity defense-is analyzed.
A. Euthanasia:Criminal Offense
Prior to the enactment of the Euthanasia Act of 2001, section 293 of the
his request. 18
Dutch Criminal Code prohibited the taking of another's life at
Section 294 prohibited forcing another to commit suicide, or assisting
another upon request to commit suicide, or providing upon request the
means to commit suicide. The crime in section 293 was called euthanasia,
and in section 294, assisted suicide. In the literature, however, both courses
of action are referred to as euthanasia: a deliberate commission or omission
to shorten another's life at his or her request. 19 The person so requested
either provides the other the means to commit suicide or physically
administers the means himself. Although providing the means and actually
administering the means are fundamentally different courses of actions,
Dutch courts have not attempted to distinguish between them when called
upon to determine the lawfulness of the action.
People compare euthanasia with murder because both involve the
deliberate and premeditated taking of life. However, a person's request for
death gives the act of euthanasia a totally different character than murder.
The criminal elements are different in cases of euthanasia than in cases of
murder. In cases of euthanasia, the intent of the person carrying through
with the action may be regarded as being directed toward life, or the
sanctity of life, as compared to murder where the person carrying through
with the action has malicious intent toward the individual he seeks to kill
and, by implication, has a complete disregard for the sanctity of life. In all
cases of euthanasia, the patient is compos mentis (of sound mind and
reason) and voluntarily seeks the assistance of a doctor to end his life. The
18.

WvS § 294 [Dutch Criminal Code].

19. See LEENEN, supra note 2. See also JOHN GRIFFITHS ET AL., EUTHANASIA AND LAW
INTHE NETHERLANDS 17 (1998).
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discussion here does not focus on passive euthanasia, withdrawal of
treatment, or involuntary euthanasia. These courses of action pose
additional moral and ethical dilemmas which ought to be addressed
separately.
B. What is the Necessity Defense?
As discussed, in the Netherlands euthanasia is a crime out of which the
courts have carved a narrow exception in cases of illness accompanied by
unbearable and hopeless suffering. In these cases, a doctor may plead the
necessity defense. The defense of necessity arises under Dutch law when a
person is confronted with conflicting duties in reaching a particular goal.20
The classic example involves an optician who sold a man a pair of
spectacles after closing time. 2 1 The optician argued that he was confronted
with a dilemma. On the one hand, he had a duty to obey the law, but on the
other hand, he felt himself obliged as an optician to assist the man, as the
man would have been completely helpless without his spectacles.22 The
court held that the optician made a justifiable choice to violate the law in
order to attain some higher good. The court accepted that the optician had
acted proportionally and that there were no less radical means, no viable
alternatives, which he could have used to solve the dilemma.
It is important to note that the court emphasized the optician's status as a
professional man when considering his conflict of duties.23 The court held
that the optician's social and professional integrity, as well as his
obligations to the patient, outweighed his legal responsibility to adhere to
the closing time regulations.24 Therefore, the holding is evidence that the
court attached some importance to the special position of the optician,
whose duties to his patients reached over and beyond those duties that were
common to all. This last observation is important for doctors with respect
20. WvS § 40 [Dutch Criminal Code]. The necessity defense may also arise under
Dutch criminal law when the accused claims to have violated the law because of some
physical or psychological external constraint or duress. The external constraint or duress is
of such a force that it compels the accused to violate the law. Thus, for example, a person
who is asked to hand over a sum of money he holds in trust for another at gunpoint can do so
without incurring the wrath of criminal law. In these circumstances, the free will of the
person is lost as a result of external pressure. See, e.g., Rb. Utrecht, 12 Dec. 1994, N.J.
1996, 245.
21. HR 15 Oct. 1923, N.J. 1923, 1329. Under the bylaws of Amsterdam, shopkeepers
had to close their shops at six in the evening. Violation of the bylaw was a criminal offense.
See Verordening op de Winkelsluiting [Bylaw on shop closing hour] art. 9.
22. HR 15 Oct. 1923, N.J. 1923, 1329.

23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
In Dutch law this is referred to as Garantenstellung.
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of euthanasia because in the debate about lawful euthanasia doctors are
regarded as the appropriate professionals to whom euthanasia maybe
entrusted.2 6
Thus, there are two criteria to the necessity defense, as interpreted
authoritatively by the Supreme Court in the Optician case. First, a
physician must be presented with a conflict of duties. Second, in deciding
whether to obey the law, a physician must consider whether the means he
will use are proportionate to the goal and whether there are alternative
means by which this goal may be achieved. In addition, when considering
the elements, the courts will take into account the status of the person who
has entered into a conflict of duties. How do these criteria apply in cases of
euthanasia?
The courts first addressed euthanasia in 1973.27 At that time, the
Leeuwarden court held that a doctor who had taken the life of her mother
upon her request was guilty of the crime of euthanasia. However, the court
did not impose a sentence. 28 Defense counsel appealed to the necessity
defense, but the court rejected the argument. Although rejecting the
necessity defense in that case, the court stated that there could be
circumstances in which a necessity defense could be successful. The
Leeuwarden decision set the stage for the debate surrounding euthanasia
that was to follow, in and outside the courtroom.
A decade later, the Supreme Court finally accepted the necessity
defense. 29 In Euthanasia I, a ninety-four-year-old woman had a chronic
physical illness which caused her unbearable suffering. As far as she was
concerned, her suffering would only be relieved if she could die in a
humane manner. 30 Her family doctor fulfilled her request and gave her a
lethal potion. 31 He was charged and prosecuted under section 293 of the
Dutch Criminal Code.3 2 In court, the doctor argued that his patient's wish
to die presented a conflict of duties. On the one hand, he had a legal duty to
preserve life, as implied under section 293; on the other hand, he had a
professional duty to his patient to relieve her suffering. In the doctor's
opinion, to fulfill the latter would only result in his patient's death, thereby

26. See KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 128-35.
27. Rb. Leeuwarden, 21 Feb. 1973, N.J. 1973, 183. There had been previous cases, for
example Rb. Utrecht, 11 Mar. 1952, N.J. 1952, 275. However, the 1973 case sparked the
debate that has continued ever since. See KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 24. The 1952 case was
the first case involving a doctor.
28. Rb. Leeuwarden, 21 Feb. 1973, N.J. 1973, 183, at 561.
29. HR 14 Nov. 1984, N.J. 1985, 106.
30. Id. at 455.
31. Id. at456.
32. Id. at 453.
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breaching his legal duty and violating section 293. Accordingly, the doctor
relied on the defense of necessity to argue his innocence. However, had he
entered into a conflict of duties and if so, had he acted proportionally?
1. A Conflict of Duties
An analysis of the case law shows that only doctors are ever held to be in
a position where they can be confronted with a conflict of duties. 33 One
reason for this unique application of the conflict of duties doctrine lies in
the specific nature of the doctor-patient relationship and the status of the
doctor as a professional. The courts accept that there is a special
relationship between the doctor and patient and, consequently, focus on
how a doctor acted in a given situation to conclude whether' he could have
acted differently. If he could have acted differently and thereby meet the
patient's needs without harming (i.e. killing) the patient, he did not enter
into a conflict of duties.
Therefore, it remains worthwhile to consider how a doctor enters into a
conflict of duties. When a patient initially consults a doctor, the doctor first
considers whether he can be of assistance to the patient or whether the
patient should be referred elsewhere, to a specialist, for example. This is a
clinical and professional consideration which is part of the on-going
professional relationship between the doctor and patient.34 Thus, the conflict
of duties criterion of the necessity defense is primarily about the extent of
the doctor-patient relationship and requires a determination of what the
doctor is able to do for the patient.
Next, the doctor considers whether he can assist the patient and by what
means he will do so. This consideration illustrates that a conflict of duties,
a moral or ethical dilemma, is not legal in nature, but rather arises out of the
pre-existing relationship between doctor and patient. In other words, the
doctor's consideration of what is best for the patient does not stem from a
statutory code or judge-made law.
Case law reveals the extent to which the doctor-patient relationship
impacts a court's analysis of the necessity defense. In Euthanasia 11,35
where the Supreme Court affirmed the decision in EuthanasiaI, the lower
court held that the necessity defense had to fail because the doctor had put
himself into a position of culpa in causa, meaning that the doctor, through

33. In cases, where persons other then doctors pled the necessity defense, the defense
was not accepted. Indeed, no defense was accepted at all. See, e.g., Rb. Utrecht, 11 Mar.
1952, N.J. 1952, 275; Rb. Den Bosch, 10 June 2003 (LJN AF9725), available at http://
www.rechtsspraakk.nl.
34. For example, in EuthanasiaI, the woman had been the doctor's patient since 1976.
35. HR 21 Oct. 1986, N.J. 1987, 607.
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his own free will, placed himself in a position where he was confronted
with a conflict of duties.36 Thus, based on the lower court's reasoning, in
order to rebut the necessity defense presumably one need only argue that a
doctor places himself voluntarily into a position that may present a conflict
of duties. In other words, by voluntarily placing oneself into a situation
where a conflict of duty ultimately arises, the necessity defense cannot be
argued.
However, it is respectfully suggested that this proposition is invalid since
it ignores the unique position of a doctor.37 The Supreme Court recognized
the special position of professionals in the Optician case. 38 There, it had
attached some importance to the special position of the optician and his
professional duties, holding that those duties outweighed the generic legal
responsibility to close the shop at a specific time applicable to all
shopkeepers. Similarly, the specific nature of the doctor-patient relationship
obliges a doctor to take into account all that is in his sphere of knowledge
and expertise to guide his decisions as the patient's case develops.
Accordingly, a doctor does not always voluntarily put himself into a
conflict of duties but rather a conflict of duties may arise as a patient's case
progresses.
For example, in EuthanasiaII, the patient had, on previous occasions,
expressed a desire for euthanasia as an option for relieving her pain. The
doctor knew she had signed a living will. As her physical situation
worsened and her suffering increased, euthanasia became a more realistic
option. Thus, in situations such as that, there comes a point in time when a
doctor cannot forsake his patient and must confront that which the patient
desires, however irrational or unreal those desires might seem. It is perhaps
then that a doctor enters involuntarily and even unwillingly, but necessarily
and unavoidingly, into the conflict of duties, which is the subject of debate.
The conflict is heightened by the physician's knowledge that the patient
confronts him voluntarily, persistently, and sincerely with the wish to die.39
But what happens when, unlike in the EuthanasiaI and H cases where
there was a long-standing doctor-patient relationship, a patient specifically
consults a doctor for the sole reason of euthanasia and there is no a preexisting relationship? Would this type of situation prevent a physician from
arguing the necessity defense? While this may be a logical conclusion,
36.

See

J. REMMELINK, HAZEWINKEL-SURINGA'S

INLEIDING TOT DE STUDIE VAN HET

NEDERLANDSE STRAFRECHT 310-11 (14th ed. 1995).

37.

The Supreme Court did not address this argument in its decision in EuthanasiaI.

38.

HR 15 Oct. 1932, N.J. 1932, 1329.

39. Of course, I do not suggest here that a doctor is obliged to assist. - If a doctor is
opposed to euthanasia he can indicate this to his patient. It is generally accepted that in such
instances a doctor should refer the patient to another who is not opposed to euthanasia per se.
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such a conclusion would not do justice to the professional integrity of a
doctor. At that point, the doctor is not concerned with the request for
euthanasia but rather with the question of whether he can relieve the
patient's suffering; the request is a cry for help. The physician must form a
medical opinion of the patient's condition and request. On the basis of this
opinion, he must decide and discuss with the patient whether euthanasia is a
realistic option. This next stage involves medical as well as ethical
considerations. If the consideration leads to the unavoidable conclusion that
euthanasia is the only realistic option, under the current legal context, the
physician will have entered into a conflict of duties once the patient
requests euthanasia.40
Of course, under the current legal framework, the patient's request for
euthanasia must stem from a medically indicated condition. Outside the
boundaries of medical knowledge, a doctor may not entertain a person's
wish to die because in that scenario he is no longer acting as a doctor and
thus, there is no doctor-patient relationship. Thus, it is clear that the
patient-physician relationship has boundaries defined by the medical nature
of patient's complaint and within those boundaries the doctor may be
confronted with a conflict of duties. Beyond those boundaries, it can no
longer be said that a doctor enters into a conflict of duties because he is
acting outside the scope of the doctor-patient relationship.
2. Proportionality
The second criterion that must be met for a successful appeal to the
necessity defense demands that the means used are proportionate to the aim
and that one has considered the availability of less radical means.41 In the
context of euthanasia, this means that the doctor must have considered the
lethal potion to be proportionate to the aim of relieving the suffering of the
patient in the absence of less radical means, such as alternative forms of
palliative care.
Is a lethal potion a proportionate means to relieve suffering? It is a
strange question to ask, but to not ask the question would be to ignore the

40. The doctor's professional integrity and obligations demands that he must enter into
such a situation. For example, see the arguments of counsel for the accused in Euthanasia
II, HR 21 Oct. 1986, N.J. 1987, 607, at 2119. Thus, the court demands that the doctor makes
a realistic and considered judgment regardless of what the general opinion in society on
euthanasia would be, contrary to what others have thought this to mean. See also, for
example, T. Schalken in his annotation to the Chabot case, H.R. 21 June 1994, N.J. 1994,
656 (ann. TS), and G.E. Mulder in his annotation to EuthanasiaII, H.R. 21 October 1986,
N.J. 1987, 607 (ann. GEM). These interpretations leave the doctor with a large element of
discretion. PETER RIJPKEMA, RECHTERSRECHT 172 (2001).
41. See WvS art. 40 [Dutch Criminal Code]; HR 15 Oct. 1923, N.J. 1923, 1329.
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context in which a doctor attempts to relieve suffering: confrontation with a
patient suffering intolerably without any hope of improvement of this
condition. This context was not yet recognized in 1973.
In that first euthanasia case,4 2 the court accepted evidence that there was
consensus among doctors to fulfill patients' wish to die through the
43 The
administration of increasing doses of pain relieving medication.
doctors knew that the consequence of increasing the doses of pain
medication would accelerate the death of these patients. 44 The court held,
therefore, that increasing the pain medication could constitute a less radical
alternative form of treatment for terminally ill patients.45 However, the
doctor on trial had not followed this course of action. Instead, the doctor
deliberately administered a lethal dose of drugs, with the intention to cause
the death of the patient in order to relieve her suffering.46 By following this
course of action, the court held that the doctor had forfeited the necessity
defense.47 The court held that the administration of a lethal dose of drugs
was not proportionate to the stated aim: relieving the patient's suffering.4 8
The court's position illustrated the omission-commission dichotomy with
which many other courts appear to struggle.49 In omission cases, the
doctor's intention in administering increasing pain medication is to relieve
the patient's pain and not to kill him, even though death is the known
consequence. This course of action is often accompanied with withdrawal
of treatment, including nourishment; the omission, then, causes the patient's
death. 50 Courts are willing to accept such a course of action. However, the
doctor in the Leeuwarden case went a step further and actually killed the
patient by administering a lethal amount of medication-a commission.
For the court, this was one step too far.5'
Another decade passed before the courts in the Netherlands accepted
that, from a criminal law perspective, there is no difference between a
passive course of action and an affirmative course of action, at least when
42. Rb. Leeuwarden, 21 Feb. 1973, N.J. 1973, 183.
43. Id. at 558.
44. This was called "passive euthanasia."
45. Rb. Leeuwarden, 21 Feb. 1973, N.J. 1973, 183, at 558.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 560.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland [1993] A.C. 789 (U.K.); A (Children)
[2000] E.W.C.A. Civ. 254 (22 Sept. 2000) (The "Siamese twin" case) (U.K.). See also Re A
Ward of Court [1996] 2 I.L.R.M. 401 (Ir.).
50. Normally, consent is given, either by the patient (through a living will) or his next of
kin, to discontinue treatment.
51. Rb. Leeuwarden, 21 Feb. 1973, N.J. 1973, 183. Courts outside the Netherlands also
have refused to condone this act. See supranote 50.
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the result--death-is considered. Thus, in EuthanasiaI decided in 1984,
the court accepted the doctor's evidence that the patient's suffering was
hopeless and unbearable as a result of her worsened psychological and
physical state.52 The patient's desire to die had been sincere, persistent, and
voluntary. No other realistic treatment options were available that could
relieve the suffering without ending in her death. The doctor had consulted
his assistant, who had seen the patient and who confirmed the doctor's
conclusions. For the court, this was also proof that the doctor had acted in
accordance with current medical and ethical standards and his medical skill
and knowledge.53 The court of appeal held that the necessity defense had to
fail because palliative care remained an option, but the Supreme Court
overruled the decision.54 According to the Supreme Court, this decision
ignored the skill, expertise and knowledge of the doctor, as a doctor, when
he came to his decision that euthanasia was all that was left as a realistic
option to relieve the suffering of his patient.55
The decision of the Supreme Court was affirmed in EuthanasiaJ1,56 and
expanded upon in Chabot.5 7 It prompted a nation-wide debate about the
legalization of euthanasia in cases of hopeless and unbearable suffering. It
would eventually lead to the enactment a legislative framework.
III. THE LEGISLATION
The current legislative framework came into force in 2001. The
Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures)
Act of 2001 has codified the criteria developed by the Supreme Court in
EuthanasiaI, allowing an appeal on the necessity defense. 8 It is outside
52. HR 14 Nov. 1984, N.J. 1985, 106, at 459.
53. At the time, the Royal Dutch Medical Association had formulated its position on
euthanasia. The Association accepted euthanasia as an option for patients whose suffering is
hopeless and unbearable. The doctor had to determine whether the death wish, which was a
result of the suffering, was sincere, persistent, and voluntary. This depended on the nature
and extent of the suffering as well as the availability of alternatives. The doctor also had to
consult another doctor, who had to confirm the suffering and the merits of the patient's
request. See Report of the Euthanasia Comm., Vision on Euthanasia,in EUTHANASIA IN THE

NETHERLANDS RMDA 12 (1994). The Association also pointed out that it was irrelevant
whether the suffering stemmed from a terminal illness. The Association also did not ascribe
an overriding importance as to whether death was imminent, since this would not sufficiently
recognize how the patient experienced the suffering. Id.
54. HR 14 Nov. 1984, N.J. 1985, 106, at 459.
55. Id. at 460.
56. HR 21 Oct. 1986, N.J. 1987, 607.
57. HR21 June 1994, N.J. 1994, 656.
58. Wet toetsing levensbedindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding (Stb. 2001, 194)
[The Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act of
2001].
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the scope of this article to give a comprehensive review of the legislation
and a cursory summary of the main points suffices.
The Act amends sections 293 and 294 of the Dutch Criminal Code.
Subsection 2 of both Sections 293 and 294 states that euthanasia or assisted
suicide is not unlawful if and when a doctor, who fulfilled a death request,
has adhered to the due care criteria set out in the Act, and has notified the
local coroner of his actions conform the Burial Act, 1992. 59 To adhere to
due care under Section 2 means:
*
*
"
*
*

*

The doctor must have been convinced that the patient's request
was sincere and voluntary;
The doctor must have been convinced that the patient's suffering
was both hopeless and unbearable;
The doctor must have consulted with the patient about his
situation and his prospects;
The doctor and the patient together must have come to the
conclusion that no alternative is realistically available;
The patient must have been seen by at least one impartial doctor,
who must have given his opinion, in writing, about the first four
criteria; and
The doctor must have carried out the euthanasia, or assisted with
the suicide, with due care.

In addition to setting forth the criteria for due care, the Act introduces
statutory ethics committees, 60 whose task it is to assess the doctor's conduct
on the basis of the information he has provided to the local coroner. There
are six regional committees which operate independently. 61 Each committee
consists of a lawyer, a doctor, and an ethicist. If a committee determines
that a doctor has acted in accordance with the criteria, the matters ends
there.62 On the other hand, if the committee believes that a doctor did not
59. Wet op de lijkbezorging, § 7(2), 1991 (Stb 2001, 194) [Burian Act, 1991]. The
doctor is required to notify the local coroner, fill in a form, and provide details about the act
and the manner in which he has adhered to the due care criteria. The form is specified by
law. See Vaststellingsbesluit formulieren bedoeld in de Wet op de lijkbezorging betreffende
overlijden ten gevolge van niet-natuurlijke oorzaak (No. 5133202/01/6 -6 Mar. 2002)
[Decision to determine use of forms as meant in the Burial Act with respect to death by
unnatural causes].
60. Prior to the legislation, these committees already existed; they now have statutory
recognition.
61. The Minister appoints their members but has no control over the decisions they take.
See Wet toetsing levensbedindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding (Stb. 2001, 194) [The
Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act of 2001], art.
4.
62. See id. arts. 8-10.
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act with due care, it may notify the district attorney, who can take action at
his discretion.63 However, a doctor's duty to report has been a recurring
problem. Statistics show that perhaps as many as fifty percent of cases
remain unreported. It is unclear what type of cases these are but this lack of
reporting is an impediment to the efficient operation of the legislation.
A. A Medical Exception to Euthanasiabut Not a GeneralException
This article suggests that the law allows for a medical exception because
only doctors are allowed to entertain a request for euthanasia. Another
reason for the medical exception stems from the fact that considerations
about the request-specifically whether the patient's suffering has been
hopeless and unbearable-are medical or clinical considerations and
considerations upon which the courts must rely.64 Indeed, the courts do not
consider whether the patient's suffering was hopeless and unbearable but
rather consider whether the doctor could have reasonably come to this
conclusion.65 The nature and extent of a patient's suffering informs the
doctor about the proportionality of his actions and the availability of any
reasonable alternatives. The courts have not gone so far as to allow for a
general exception for euthanasia because of a fear that this would take the
country down the path to the right to euthanasia on demand. However, the
courts reinforced the position that euthanasia should be allowable in cases
of unbearable and hopeless suffering in 1973,66 1984,67 1987,68 and in
1994.69 These cases were considered during the drafting of the legislation
and it became clear that, because of the distinct set of circumstances of each
case, each euthanasia case would have to be judged on its merits and a "one
63. Much can be said about the operation of the ethics committees, but this is outside the
scope of the article. For more information, see the annual report of the committees, Annual
Report 2001, Regionale Toetsings-Commissies Euthanasie, Arnhem 2002 [Statutory Ethics
Committee on Euthanasia]. See also H.J.J. Leenen, Toetsingscommissies zin onbescheiden
[Ethics committees are not modest], NRC HANDELSBLAD, 23 May 2002. Professor Leenen
fears that the committees will apply and interpret the criteria with too much discretion and
freedom. He proposes, instead, that the committees consider a request prior to the doctor
carrying it out. His comments suggest something else: that there is also a danger that the
committees operate too autonomously and too independently from each other, which may
cause a disparity of opinion as to what is lawful and unlawful euthanasia.
64. See also the observation by Lord Steyn in Regina (Pretty) v. Director of Public
Prosecutions,Secretary of Statefor the Home Department, [2001] U.K.H.L. 61 (U.K.), at
consideration no. 55.
65. Euthanasia I, HR 14 Nov. 1984, N.J. 1985, 106; Euthanasia II, HR 21 Oct. 1986,
N.J. 1987, 607.
66. Rb. Leeuwarden, 21 Feb. 1973, N.J. 1973, 183.
67. Euthanasia I, HR 14 Nov. 1984, N.J. 1985, 106.
68. Euthanasia II, HR 21 Oct. 1986, N.J. 1987, 607.
69. Chabot, HR 21 June 1994, N.J. 1994, 656.
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Accordingly, the legislation
size, fits all" law would not suffice.
established the regional ethics committees.
So far, the legislation has overtly recognized what is really a matter of
common medical knowledge. Conscientious doctors have always regarded
the alleviation of suffering as one of their primary medical objectives. The
usual paradigm in which this operates is referred to as the doctrine of
This doctrine represents the position that the
"double effect."
administration of medication is intended to relieve suffering but recognizes,
as an unwanted side effect, the acceleration of death. Instead of holding
onto the doctrine of double effect, Dutch legislation and the judiciary has
recognized that at some stages of acute suffering life should not be
artificially continued.
The question at this point then is to what extent doctors are qualified to
determine the adequacy of a patient's request. Having medicalized lawful
euthanasia, it appears that the intention of the legislature has been to restrict
euthanasia to medically necessary instances. The degree of patient
suffering is the determining factor. An examination of the case law is
required to understand the judicial interpretation of hopeless and unbearable
suffering, the criterion by which necessary euthanasia is judged, and to
clarify the justification for lawful euthanasia.
B. "Hopeless and UnbearableSuffering"
Prior to 1994, most, if not all euthanasia cases involved patients whose
suffering stemmed from a physical cause and who were in the later stages
'70 Death was certain
of a terminal disease, described as their "dying phase.
to follow; euthanasia anticipated death, as it were. It also meant that the
patients' suffering was, on the whole, physical. Because the wish to die
was based on this physical suffering, doctors could more objectively
71 These
determine the hopeless and unbearable nature of the suffering.
cases were referred to as "classic euthanasia cases."
70. Indeed, statistics from 1996 show that the majority of patients, whose death wish
was fulfilled, suffered from a terminal illness and had a life expectancy of less than three
weeks. See G. VAN DER WAL & P.J. VAN DER MAAS, EUTHANASIE EN ANDERE MEDISCHE

BESLISSINGEN ROND HET LEVENSEINDE [EUTHANASIA AND OTHER END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS]
(1996); CENTRAAL BUREAU VOOR DE STATISTIEK (CBS), HET LEVENSEINDE IN DE MEDISCHE
PRAKTIJK, CBS, Voorburg/Heerlen (1996). The 2001 Annual Report of the Regional Ethics
Committees confirms these findings. In 2001, there were 2054 reports of euthanasia. In
1941 cases, the patient suffered from a physical illness, of which cancer was the dominant
illness (1817 cases). The Report also shows that in 1761 cases, the family doctor was the
dominant actor. See Annual Report 2001, supra note 63, at 12.
71. This point was emphasized by both the Supreme Court and the court appointed
witnesses in the Brongersma case, HR 24 Dec. 2002 (LJN AE8772), available at http://
www.rechtsspraak.nl.
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This changed in 1994. In the Chabot case," Dr. Chabot, a psychiatrist,
diagnosed a patient with depression absent psychotic symptoms. 73 After
meeting with the patient many times, Dr. Chabot concluded that in his
clinical judgment the only way to relieve her suffering was a course of
treatment that would result in her death, a desire that she had had for a long
time. Colleagues supported him in this view. Dr. Chabot assisted her in her
suicide by providing her with a lethal potion, which she drank herself.74
Dr. Chabot was prosecuted, but was acquitted by both the trial and
appellate courts. 75 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the prosecution
submitted three arguments in favor of a conviction. First, the prosecution
maintained that in the absence of a physical, terminal illness, euthanasia
could never be lawful.76 Second, considering the nature of the suffering, the
prosecution submitted that the patient was too psychologically disturbed to
have formulated a voluntary wish to die.77 Third, the prosecution asserted
that the doctor failed to consult other professionals contrary to what due
care demands.78 The Supreme Court rejected the first two arguments, but
accepted the third. 79 Dr. Chabot was found guilty, however no sentence
was imposed.8 °

72. Chabot, HR21 June 1994, N.J. 1994, 656.
73. Dr. Chabot had relied on DSM III R (Diagnostic Statistical Manual), as used by the
American Psychiatry Association. For more details about the diagnosis and the case, see
B.E. CHABOT, ZELF BESCHIKT [SELF DETERMINED] (1995). The patient's story shows
that
Dr. Chabot was confronted with a woman in extremis. The patient had married into an
unhappy marriage at the age of twenty-three and had had two children. In 1986, her eldest
son committed suicide. This affected the patient deeply and her marriage problems
worsened. She also started to express her wish to die, but also expressed that she would not
take her own life until her youngest son could fend for himself. She underwent psychiatric
treatment but this was of no avail. Her father died in 1988 and she divorced from her
husband in 1990. In that same year, her youngest son was involved in a traffic accident.
While in the hospital, the doctors discovered a malignant tumor; he died shortly after. Hours
after the death of her youngest son, the patient attempted suicide but was unsuccessful.
From then on, she became completely preoccupied into her own death. She wanted to die in
a dignified manner and eventually came into contact with Dr. Chabot via the Dutch Society
for Voluntary Euthanasia.
74. Chabot, HR 21 June 1994, N.J. 1994, 656, at 108.
75. HofLeeuwarden, Unreported, 30 Sept. 1993.
76. HR 21 June 1994, N.J. 1994, 656, at 3147.
77. Id. at 3148.
78. Id.
79. Id. at3152-53.
80. Id. at 3156. For an English transcript of the Supreme Court judgment, see John
Griffiths, Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands: The Chabot Case, (1995) M.L.R., 232. See
also Ubaldus de Vries, The Chabot Case.: Psychological Suffering and Physician-Assisted
Suicide, in LEADING CASES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Eoin O'Dell ed., 2000)
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1. The Causes of Suffering
The importance of the Chabot case is the Court's rejection of the first
two arguments. The Court refused to distinguish between psychological and
81
physical suffering, as proposed by the prosecution. The prosecution
argued that unless the suffering is physical, the Court must opt for the
preservation of life.8 2 The Court concluded this parameter was too
restrictive because it ignored the manner in which a patient experienced
suffering.83 Furthermore, the necessity defense involved an ex post facto
analysis to determine the lawfulness of a doctor's clinical and professional
judgment of the patient's suffering, but not the cause or causes of the
suffering.8 4 Indeed, the Court held that the cause of the suffering does not
bear any real relation to how the suffering is experienced. The Court also
held that a patient does not need to be in a "dying phase" because the
underlying clinical cause does not need to amount to some terminal
illness.8 5
Since the Court refused to distinguish a physical condition from a
psychological condition, the Court, in effect, ignored the traditional
Cartesian distinction between body and mind (res extensa - res cogitans)
and, by implication, the distinction between physical and psychological
suffering. The Advocate General,86 A.G. Meijers, in his opinion, pointed
out that human experience and philosophical insight regard such a
distinction as artificial. This artificial distinction does not assist in
answering the question of how suffering and its hopelessness is experienced
by the patient himself-a subjective answer-or how suffering and
hopelessness can be determined objectively by doctors with reference to
current medico-ethical considerations. 87 The distinction, thus, disregards
the fact that physical suffering can also have a psychological effect, which
can influence the rationality of a decision. Similarly, psychological
suffering does not necessarily undermine a person's rational powers.
The Court's departure from the Cartesian paradigm has enormous
implications for the lawfulness of euthanasia under the necessity defense.
The analysis becomes less clinical, less objective, and less hypothetical
because more weight is given to the patient's subjective experiences of
81.

HR 21 June 1994, N.J. 1994, 656, at 3151.

82.
83.

Id. at 3147.
Id. at 3151.
Id.

84.
85. Id.
86. In the Dutch legal system, the Supreme Court takes into consideration the advice
given by Advocate Generals, who proffer an independent, and a more academic, analysis of
the legal problem. The advice is non-binding, but often relied upon by the Supreme Court.
87. The A.G. followed Annotator Hart in HR 28 May 1991, N.J. 1991, 784.
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suffering. However, as long as there is an illness that causes the suffering,
the Court's analysis remains objective enough to involve a clinical
judgment. This makes the suffering medical and an appeal to the necessity
defense justly survives.
2. The Nature of the Request
Can it be true that patients whose suffering is on the whole psychological
cannot make decisions to end their life voluntarily? In other words, is such
a patient compos mentis to make such decision? In Chabot,the prosecution
argued that the mental state of the patient cast doubt on her autonomy and
freedom to make decisions, including her wish to die. The nature of the
suffering, thus, was crucial in determining the nature of the wish to die. If
the suffering was determined to be psychological, too much doubt would
remain as to the voluntary nature of the death wish and the doctor should
not have acceded to it. In effect, the prosecution argued that any suffering
which is psychological in nature would undermine the free will of the
patient and would make her decision involuntary.
It could be argued that what was meant by the prosecution was that a
desire to die can be a symptom of the illness, such as in common
depression. As a symptom, the desire to die can be treated and thus,
euthanasia in that circumstance would be unlawful. The desire to die stems
from the patient's suffering, but not from the illness that is the cause of the
suffering. If this is the case, one must agree with the prosecution that the
suffering could cast doubt on the patient's mental state and on the ability to
make decisions. However, in that circumstance, the patient's decision is
not ipsofacto invalid. The connection between free will and its suppression
by a suffering mental state demands a clinical determination. A mentally ill
patient, such as the patient in Chabot, desires to die because of the mental
pain suffered. In comparison, a terminal patient's desire to die is derived
from suffering as well as knowledge that death is imminent. In that
circumstance, the suffering is both physical and psychological; both the
illness and the suffering bear upon the patient's decision and the doctor's
diagnosis. Accordingly, it would be illogical to say that the free will in the
latter is preserved and not in the former. Neither patient is able to come to a
decision in "complete freedom," which the prosecution maintained should
be the criterion for determining whether the necessity defense should
prevail.
Indeed, the Supreme Court held that there is no such thing as complete
freedom. 8 Psychiatric patients, as much as somatic patients, are able to
88. HR 21 June 1994, N.J. 1994, 656, at 3152. The House of Lords in England held
similarly in In Re C [Adult: Refusing of Medical Treatment] [1994] 1 W.L.R. 290. In that
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arrive at autonomous decisions. The prosecution failed to understand the
meaning of freedom, which is connected to a person's mental state. Of
course, there is a point where the mental state prevents a person from acting
autonomously, but this remains a clinical determination. The Court
nonetheless agreed with the prosecution that the determination of whether a
89
decision is made autonomously must be a careful one. As a result, the
Court held that Dr. Chabot failed to meet the criteria of the necessity
defense because he had not consulted other doctors who had seen the
patient themselves.
3. Suffering as the Foundation of the Defense
The Supreme Court in Chabot gave express recognition to the belief that
9°
in order to assess suffering, it must be abstracted from its cause. On one
hand, the case suggests that the decision of any patient who is sufficiently
compos mentis to formulate a wish to die should be respected. On the other
hand, the case suggests that the patient displayed sufficient capacity to
consent to the sort of palliative treatment that actually ended her life. As to
the latter view, the Court made a realistic and humane judgment when it
recognized a cautious professional approach to an extreme situation. In
doing so, the Court demanded that the patient be carefully and properly
informed of all the available options as well as allowed to come to a
decision to take the only available palliative option.
C. Suffering in the Absence of a Clinical Cause
It was believed that the 2001 legislation would end the debates
surrounding the practice of euthanasia or at least would provide a degree of
certainty as to the lawfulness of euthanasia and assisted suicide. However,
at the same time the legislation was passed in parliament, the Brongersma
case appeared before a regional court. A discussion about the boundaries of
lawful euthanasia and, by implication, the boundaries of the doctor-patient
relationship, was again highlighted in this case.
In Brongersma, a doctor assisted in the suicide of an elderly man, who
had not had any illness but whose suffering the doctor believed to be
hopeless and unbearable. 91 Mr. Brongersma, a former lawyer and Senator
case, a paranoid schizophrenic patient refused to consent to the amputation of his gangrenous
leg. The court held that a doctor must consider whether the patient's capacity is so reduced
by the patient's mental illness that he does not sufficiently understand the purpose and
effects of the treatment.
89. See also Annual Report 2001, supra note 63, at 15.
90. HR 21 June 1994, N.J. 1994, 656, at 3150-51.
91. Rb. Haarlem, 30 Oct. 2000 (LJN AD7926), availableat www.rechtsspraak.nl.
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who had been a supporter of death on request, had been consulting the
doctor since 1986.92 He signed a living will in 1984, which he renewed in
1994 and 1998. In 1998, Mr. Brongersma had had some physical
complaints and told his doctor that he suffered under his physical
deterioration and the senselessness of his existence. 93
In fact, Mr.
Brongersma had attempted suicide in 1996. 94 Mr. Brongersma and his
doctor discussed his desire to die and the possibility of assisted suicide in
more detail during eight subsequent interviews. 95 In addition, a psychiatrist
evaluated the Mr. Brongersma and concluded that he did not suffer from
any psychiatric illness which could have explained the desire to die.
Another doctor confirmed that the Mr. Brongersma's desire to die was
sincere and voluntary. In April 1998, Mr. Brongersma committed suicide
96
assisted by his doctor.
1. Existential Suffering
An issue of first impression, the Brongersma case posed the question of
whether euthanasia or assisted suicide is lawful in the absence of a clinical
illness that causes the patient to suffer hopelessly and unbearably. The case
concerned "existential suffering," which was defined by one of the experts
at the trial as the unbearable suffering of life in the absence of any clinical
cause and without hope of any improvement. 97 One may refer to it as "nonmedical euthanasia." If the Court recognized non-medical euthanasia, it
would effectively mean that the Supreme Court would recognize the
practice of euthanasia outside the realm of the doctor-patient relationship.
Considering its own case law, as well as the parliamentary history of the
Euthanasia Act of 2001, the Court refused to deem this lawful. To clearly
understand the Supreme Court judgment it is important to analyze the
judgments of the trial court and the court of appeal.
The trial court held that a clinical cause was not a necessary condition,
deviating from what was established case law of the Supreme Court.98 The
trial court held that since the patient's suffering appeared to have no direct
physical cause and that the patient had not been in a "dying phase," a more
careful determination of the suffering was warranted, along the lines of that

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

97.

Rb. Haarlem, 30 Oct. 2000 (LJN AD7926), at 5.
Cf. Euthanasia I, HR 14 Nov. 1984, N.J. 1985, 106; Euthanasia II, HR 21 Oct. 1986,
N.J. 1987, 607; Chabot, HR 21 June 1994 N.J. 1994, 656.

98.
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required by the Supreme Court in Chabot.99 The trial court then departed
from the customary analysis (which entailed a determination of an objective
and clinical consideration of the hopelessness and unbearableness of the
patient's suffering) and considered instead how the patient himself had
The trial court stated that unbearable
experienced his suffering. 100
suffering-contrary to its hopelessness-is subjective because it consists of
1
both situational and personal elements. ' This being so, the trial court
stated it had limited opportunity to test whether the doctor could have
reasonably come to the conclusion that the suffering had been unbearable.
Accordingly, the trial court asked expert witnesses to place the nature of
this kind of suffering in a wider theoretical context. One expert opined that
the absence of a serious illness does not imply that a person necessarily
10 2
She explained that a person could
experiences a healthy or happy life.
result of, for example, the physical
a
as
bad
be
to
life
consider his quality of
10 3
This
and psychological deterioration that can come with old age.
deterioration is ongoing and cannot always be treated, for example, with
geronto-psychiatric care. Another expert agreed and stated that the
suffering, such as experienced by Mr. Brongersma, could be characterized
as the absence of any perspective on improving one's position and may
indeed be unbearable to bear. 10 4 According to the expert, evaluating
whether or not such suffering is "authentic" or "real" depends on the
05
As far as the
character of the patient, his personality, and integrity.1
Brongersma's
Mr.
that
believed
experts could interpret the facts, they
suffering had been authentic.
It is interesting to note the choice of language used by the experts. In
previous cases "suffering" was referred to as "clinical suffering," which
could be objectively determined since it derived from a clinical cause. In
the absence of such a clinical cause, the suffering becomes more difficult to
determine objectively; in fact, the suffering is utterly subjective. In cases of
suffering that do not stem from a clinical cause, the expert must ask
whether the suffering is "real," i.e. whether the patient is serious about his
state of life and his request to die or whether his "suffering" is really a cry
for attention or help. According to this view it may be argued that, in cases
of existential suffering, the desire to die is encapsulated, disguised, or
99. Rb. Haarlem, 30 Oct. 2000 (LJN AD7926), at 4.
100. The court hinted that it could use the "substitute judgment test" in considering how
the patient experienced suffering.
101. Rb. Haarlem, 30 Oct. 2000 (LJN AD7926), at 4.
102. Id. at4.
103. Id. at 4-5.
104. Id. at 5.
105. Id.
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represented by the suffering. It perhaps exposes a belief on the part of the
expert that euthanasia on demand cannot be honored but a request on the
basis of suffering of any type, whether existential or clinical, can.
However, with all due respect to such experts, this appears to be wishful
dialectic.
The experts' conclusion at the trial was that a person can suffer without
illness. While this was not a new concept, the trial court concluded that the
doctor could justifiably rely on the necessity defense in such a
circumstance. The court accepted existential suffering as a ground for
lawful euthanasia by doctors and accordingly, concluded that the
underlying clinical cause was really irrelevant. However, is this what was
originally intended by the Supreme Court when it constructed the necessity
defense in Euthanasia1? Doesn't a review of the case law, as well as the
legislation, require the conclusion that what is meant by "suffering" is
suffering as a result of some physical or psychological illness (clinical
suffering)? Any other interpretation would place lawful euthanasia outside
the realm of medicine and the doctor-patient relationship since the suffering
need not to be based on a clinical cause and the determination of suffering
would no longer require a clinical determination. Or is this too traditional
an approach toward suffering and toward the function of a doctor,
particularly a family doctor?
2. Outside the Medical Realm
Unlike the Brognersma trial court, the court of appeal held on to the
traditional approach and overruled the trial court. 10 6 The court thought it
was unclear whether the doctor found himself in a conflict of duties when
suffering was other than medical or clinical.10 7 The court was hesitant to
comment on the role and function of doctors confronted with a request to
die on the basis of existential suffering. Does existential suffering belong to
the domain of traditional medicine? If not, a doctor could not enter into a
conflict of duties when presented with a request to end one's life on the
basis of existential suffering. To answer this fundamental question, the
court ordered a preliminary judgment and appointed two expert witnesses
whose task it was to answer three questions for the court: (1) whether a
doctor could legitimately honor a request for euthanasia in the absence of
any physical or psychological illness; (2) whether it is part of a doctor's
function to assist people, whose suffering is primarily characterized by
psychological factors, such as the daily experience of an empty and lonely
106. Hof Amsterdam, 6 Dec. 2001 (LJN AD6753),
www.rechtsspraak.nl.
107. Hof Amsterdam, 8 May 2001 (LJN AD1474), at 3.
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existence and the fear that it may continue for many years; and (3) whether
there is a0 8consensus among doctors about the answer to these three
questions.
The Supreme Court adopted many of the considerations of the court of
appeal, in particular, the opinions of the two experts. 0 9 The experts
concluded that the answers to the first two questions were one of opinion
about which there was not yet a consensus among doctors." 0 Indeed, no
information could be derived from statistics or opinion polls. Discussion of
this type of case had only recently begun. Both experts believed that a
doctor should not assume that he is permitted to honor a request to die
based on existential suffering or that it is part of a doctor's duty to assist
such persons in their quest for death."' One of the experts, Professor
Legemaate, stated that doctors could only legitimately honor such a request
when the suffering derived from a physical or psychological cause. Thus,
as far as he was concerned lawful euthanasia should be restricted to cases
that are medically or clinically indicated. The other expert, Professor
Spreeuwenberg, agreed stating that cases such as the Brongersma case did
not belong within the professional remit of doctors. Hence, there could
never be an obligation on the part of doctors to assist people with a death
wish based on existential suffering. Professor Spreeuwenberg stated that it
is a doctor's duty to consider whether the symptoms of a patient's suffering
are caused by an illness in order to determine whether the case falls within
the realm of medicine. 112 If so, euthanasia may be justified.
The Supreme Court, in confirming the appellate court's decision, drew a
demarcation line with regard to the professional duties of a doctor. The
Court held that questions about life and existential suffering fall outside a
doctor's professional competence." 3 Indeed, the experts attested that not
much was known about such questions. According to the Court that meant
that a desire to die, inspired by such suffering, is not a request that a doctor
can entertain under the current legal framework; if he entertains such
requests, he is not acting as a doctor and thus cannot be protected by the
necessity defense. 1 4 The Court held that life problems are not medical

108. Hof Amsterdam, 6 Dec. 2001 (LJN AD6753), at 6.
109. Brongersma, HR 24 Dec. 2002 (LJN AE8772), available at http://
www.rechtsspraak.nl. One of the experts, John Legemaate, is a professor of health law at the
Erasmus University of Rotterdam. The other expert, Cor Spreeuwenberg, is a professor of
integrated health care for chronically ill people at the University of Maastricht.
110. HR 24 Dec. 2002 (LJN AE8772), at 9.
111. Id. at9,10.
112. Id. at lO.
113. Id. at 16.
114. Id.
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problems; the doctor is not a specialist on questions concerning existence
such as, for example, hopeless despair, loneliness, or existential suffering
caused by the inability to adapt to a new situation.
D. Justificationfor Euthanasia
The decisions in Chabot and Brongersma have, for the first time in a
legal context, raised the question of whether death is "natural." Is death a
consummation of life that arrives in its own good time? In considering this,
the courts have recognized that death has political, social, and economic
repercussions. Society may wish to consider that death is an inevitable goal
to be attained, with the maximum of dignity, care, and painlessness when
all alternative methods of coping with life and its attendant inflictions have
been exhausted. If so, then society must adjust its political, economic, and
religious prejudices to provide this particular form of intervention. Dutch
society has gone a long way to adapt its prejudices. Lawful euthanasia is
firmly rooted within medicine and, by implication, the doctor-patient
relationship. This means that euthanasia must remain based on medical
considerations about causes and suffering. Euthanasia is an exception to a
general rule-an option to an extreme situation-rather than the general
rule itself. A justification for this exception is found in the medical context
itself, with reference to the role of the doctor, serving the interests of the
patient, and the nature of the doctor-patient relationship, in which a
confidential discussion about life and death usually takes place.
IV. AUTONOMY AND THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
The principle of autonomy and the attendant right to self-determination
each refer to a person having the freedom to determine what he or she can
do with life. Both principles permit people to follow a particular conception
of the good life, but by no means can it be said that people enjoy total
autonomy. Restrictions are necessarily in place since autonomous acts may
harm others, cause them offense, or are so morally reprehensible as to be
prohibited by law. Furthermore, individual actions often require
dependence on others. This dependency takes many forms. Does
autonomy go as far as to include the freedom of one person to ask another
to kill him? Here, autonomy does not refer to the freedom to end one's own
life. Suicide is the act that gives expression to this freedom and is not
legally prohibited in most countries, including the Netherlands. 15 Rather,
autonomy appears to refer to whether one person can ask another to
115. The Dutch Criminal Code does not recognize suicide as a criminal offence. Nor is
the crime of "suicide" found in the criminal status of other Western European countries, such
as Belgium, France, the U.K., and Ireland. In some U.S. states suicide is a crime.
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lawfully assist him to die. But, can autonomy be extended to others? It is
argued that criminalizing the person who carries out euthanasia or assists in
a suicide obstructs the autonomy of the person seeking death." 6 This
argument lends itself to the proposition that "the state must not do anything
that obstructs the exercise of what is regarded as a fundamental
freedom."117
In the context of euthanasia, the dependency takes shape within the
doctor-patient relationship. The consensus in the Netherlands, beginning in
the 1980s and continuing through today, sees the doctor as the only suitable
person to whom euthanasia and decisions about life and death can be
trusted. 1 8 The doctor is assumed to be the instrument by which death is
achieved. However, this assumption fails to do justice to the role of the
doctor in the doctor-patient relationship. It fails to address the context with
which autonomy has been embedded within medicine. The language of
autonomy is necessarily different in the medical context, as society is
uncomfortable in imposing upon doctors a duty to kill. Autonomy, here,
refers to the right to decide what is to be done to one's body, i.e. the right to
bodily integrity, and demands that doctors serve the patient's best interests.
The context must seek to reconcile the dialectic of the patient (the right to
die based on the principle of autonomy) with the dialectic of the doctor (the
freedom to serve his patient's best interests). These different notions of
autonomy must be reconciled.
Thus, within the doctor-patient relationship, the patient's autonomy
involves the patient defining his own needs and determining the nature of
the satisfaction of those needs (a patronage system or patient-centered
model). 119 Others consider the relationship to represent a so-called
collegiate system or doctor-centered model. In this system, the doctor
determines the needs of the patient and the manner in which they are
satisfied. 120 The notions of consent and informed consent illustrate that the
doctor-patient relationship is actually a mix of the two extremes. The
patient is recognized as a party to the relationship and is not regarded as a
mere object of the relationship. The moral notion of autonomy is expressed
in the legal notion of consent as the former implies that patients decide if
116.
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118. KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 128-35.
119. Cosmetic surgery for aesthetic reasons where the patient defines his own needs,
may be a case in point.
120. See, e.g., B.S. TURNER, MEDICAL POWER AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE 136-37 (1987);
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they want a certain form of medical treatment administered to them. Thus,
no person can be treated if that person does not consent to such treatment.
The patient can only consent if he is also properly informed about the
alternative treatment options and their effects.'21
The law of informed consent has allowed people to refuse treatment or
have treatment withdrawn with the possible, or intended, consequence that
death will follow. 22 Indeed, autonomy in medicine gives shape and
recognition to an individual right to bodily integrity; autonomy is a shield
against unlawful invasion of the body, not a sword by which people can
demand the invasion of the body. 123
How does this conception of autonomy apply to euthanasia? 'As
mentioned above, there is consensus that doctors are best equipped to deal
with issues of life and death. 24 This may inform interpretations of the
notion of autonomy. Within the doctor-patient relationship, autonomy
cannot be regarded as a patient having the right to have a doctor assist him
in the materialization of his wish to die. Rather, autonomy means the
freedom to consult with a doctor about the options of treatment at life's end
and the ability to understand and consent to an option that may deliberately
and intentionally end life. From this, it follows that autonomy cannot be the
25
basis on which to justify an overt right to euthanasia on demand.1
The language in which autonomy has been dressed up may have given
rise to the expectation that one may demand euthanasia. However, those
who adopt the language of autonomy have failed to recognize that doctors
who are confronted with a patient who has a sincere wish to die are not in a
position to cater solely to the patient's desires. Medical ethics require that,
regardless of what the law demands, doctors make a clinical and
professional judgment about the validity of the request to die and the
121. See Dutch Civil Code, Book 7, art. 450. See also Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948),
availableat http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (recognizing basic human rights); The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3ib/a ccpr.htm; Council of Europe, The European
Convention of Human Rights (1950), available at http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html.
In England, the decision in Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hosp. Governors, [1985] 1 All E.R.
643, is illustrative of informed consent. For the Canadian perspective, see Reible v. Hughes
[1978] 21 Q.R. 2d. 14, and for the United States perspective, see the classic case of
Canterburyv. Spence, 464 F.2d. 772 (1972).
122. See, e.g., In re T. (Adult: Refusal to Treatment) [1993] Fam. 95 at 115-16 (U.K.).
123. The latter interpretation may represent the socio-economic right to health care,
which cannot be easily enforced in court.
124.

KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 128-35.

125. This line of thinking is similar to the line of thinking used to analyze the conflict of
duties faced by physicians. See supra Section II.B. 1.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol13/iss2/4

26

dr Vries: A Dutch Perspective: The Limits of Lawful Euthanasia

Limits of Lawful Euthanasia

2004]

possibility of euthanasia or assisted suicide. This limits the role and
function of the doctor. The Supreme Court in Brongersma took issue with
the doctor-patient relationship when regarding patients whose suffering was
primarily existential. The Court accepted that a doctor, particularly a family
doctor or general practitioner, must seriously consider any type of suffering,
including existential suffering. In these cases, his role is nonetheless
restricted to providing care and directing patients to those who are able to
help them dealing with their existential suffering. It would be wrong to
suggest that the doctor is capable of judging suffering of this kind or is able
to discuss the availability of alternative options for treatment of existential
suffering because, as the experts attested, there is no scientifically justified
medical insight.

126

V. CONCLUSION

This article reviewed the current Dutch law on euthanasia and physicianassisted suicide, explaining and arguing that the limits of lawful euthanasia
are drawn by courts' interpretation of the necessity defense under Dutch
criminal law. The defense requires the doctor to interpret the nature of a
patient's suffering and the means that can be used to relieve this suffering.
Thus, a doctor is said to be in a conflict of duties when he is confronted
with a patient who, because of his suffering, expresses a wish to die. If the
suffering is both hopeless and unbearable, euthanasia or assisted suicide is
an appropriate response in the absence of any alternative to relieve
suffering. Whether the suffering is both hopeless and unbearable demands
a clinical or medical determination. This means that the suffering must
have been caused by an underlying physical or psychological illness.
The courts have not accepted that suffering can be, independent from a
clinical cause, a justification for euthanasia or assisted suicide in all cases.
Thus, there is no room to interpret the necessity defense as allowing for
euthanasia in cases of existential suffering. This kind of suffering is not
regarded as "medical" and treating it does not belong to the duties of a
doctor. By not accepting euthanasia for existential suffering, courts have
shown that they are not willing to allow people other than physicians to
argue the necessity defense. The defense creates a medical exception only.
This also follows from the legislation, which emphasize the duties of a
doctor, expressed in the due care criteria to which he should adhere.

126. The court appears to keep the door open for lawful euthanasia if and when there is
a consensus among doctors as to whether existential suffering is suffering of a medical or
clinical nature. If so, it may well be that the necessity defense could extend to such cases.
The court's comment illustrates also the importance of the medical profession in the whole
of the euthanasia debate. This, however, is a subject for a different article.
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The current legal position, allowing euthanasia only in those cases of
hopeless and unbearable suffering, does not recognize an overt legal right to
euthanasia in the Netherlands. All that is recognized is that in certain
extreme situations, life need not be unnecessarily prolonged against the
wishes of the patient. Euthanasia, thus, is an exception to the rule that
prohibits the taking of life whatever the cause or reason. Justifications for
the current position are found in the meaning of individual autonomy and
the right to self-determination, the nature of the doctor-patient relationship,
and the role of the doctor. Within the doctor-patient relationship, autonomy
is understood as the right to consent to treatment such as proposed by a
doctor. It does not mean the right to ask from the doctor whatever a patient
desires. The doctor must act, and does act, on the basis of what he believes
is in the best interest of the patient. His medical skill and knowledge, as
well as medical ethics, informs him and helps him to determine what is in
the best interests of the patient. The patient can agree or disagree. However,
sometimes the best interest of the patient might be a course of action that
actually results in the death of the patient. The doctor, not so much on the
basis of the wishes of the patient, but rather on the basis of clinical and
medico-ethical considerations in which the patient is obviously involved,
decides upon this course of action. This also means that there are limits of
what a doctor can do. Anything that falls outside the medical realm, such
as, for example, cases of existential suffering, cannot provide sufficient
grounds to come to a determination that leads to euthanasia or assisted
suicide.
This analysis of Dutch position on medical euthanasia illustrates that the
matter is not settled in the Netherlands. There are many problems with the
current position. It is outside the scope of this article to discuss all of the
issues that stem from the current position and this article merely sought to
provide a descriptive analysis of the law. The main problem that the law
faces is the unwillingness of doctors to report cases of euthanasia, which
they are obligated to do under the Termination of Life on Request and
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act of 2001.
In light of this, Dutch law is at a crossroad. The criminal law perspective
can only cater to the so-called "classic" or "medical" cases of euthanasia.
The question becomes what Dutch society wants with respect to nonmedical cases of euthanasia, such as the Brongersmacase. Is Dutch society
heading toward euthanasia on demand?
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